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Radical Schiller and the Young Marx 
By Daniel Hartley 
 
This is a pre-print version of a chapter that will appear in a forthcoming edited 
volume:  
Gandesha, Samir and Johan Hartle (eds), Marx and the Aesthetic (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017).  
This pre-print is published for reference use only and should not be cited. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter reads Marx’s early writings through the lens of Schiller’s On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man and vice versa. It deploys Schiller’s letters to delineate 
a powerful strand of aesthetic logic within Marx’s developing theory of 
revolution and the state. At the same time, seen retrospectively from the 
viewpoint of the early Marx, it reconstructs a radical ‘red thread’ that runs 
throughout Schiller’s theory of the aesthetic. Unlike those ‘aesthetic’ readings 
of the young Marx that focus on the importance of the senses and alienation, 
however, this chapter understands the ‘aesthetic’ in an expanded sense as an 
immanent modality of hegemony; art, beauty and “aesthetic culture” are thus 
conceived as moments within a more expansive aesthetic process. By placing 
Marx’s reflections on journalistic style in the context of emerging individualist 
theories of style and eighteenth-century copyright debates, and by connecting 
his articles on wood-theft to a Schillerian theory of hegemony, the chapter 
shows that Marx’s aesthetic reflections were an ongoing and constitutive 
feature of his political and economic thought. 
  
 Radical Schiller and the Young Marx 
 
In Machiavelli and Us Althusser sought to solve the following “mystery”: To 
whom is The Prince addressed?1 Empirically, of course, The Prince was dedicated 
to Lorenzo de’ Medici, but does he remain its only addressee? Althusser 
demonstrates in a quite startling manner just how central to the book’s 
continued – and literal – appeal this question remains. Having spoken to Hegel 
in the present tense and Gramsci in the future, The Prince’s sustained 
interpellative power arises, suggests Althusser, from its inscription of a “dual 
place or space”: the place of the subject of political practice and the place of 
the text which politically deploys or stages this political practice” (Althusser, 
1999, 22). The former is the place produced by a conjunctural analysis that 
transforms situational elements into relations of force, calling upon an agent 
(the Prince) to intervene to resolve the “problem” of the conjuncture (18–20); 
the latter is the place of the text itself: the text (The Prince) which performs the 
conjunctural analysis becomes one of the active elements within the 
conjuncture itself. This double inscription is further complicated by the 
discrepancy between the place of the political viewpoint from which The Prince 
is written (that of the people) and the place of the political force it calls upon 
to act (the Prince) (26). This redoubled duality transforms traditional 
theoretical discourse into a singular conjunctural interpellation whose hail 
echoes across the centuries. 
Perhaps one might say the same of Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man. Ostensibly a series of real letters, Schiller included the following note in 
the original Die Horen publication of 1795: “These letters have really been 
written; but to whom is here of no relevance, and will perhaps in time be made 
known to the reader” (Schiller, 2016, 1). Empirically, we know that Schiller 
wrote at least seven letters to his patron, the Danish Prince von Augustenburg, 
but in February 1794 these were destroyed in a fire at the Copenhagen palace. 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Hammam Aldouri, Samir Gandesha and Johan Hartle for their comments on 
an earlier version of this chapter. All remaining errors are my own. 
 The letters which ultimately appeared in Die Horen were based on 
Augustenburg’s requested replacements, which were reformulated and 
expanded versions of the originals (Beiser, 2005, 121). Of those that survived 
the flames, two remarks concerning the mode and recipients of Schiller’s 
address stand out. Firstly, Schiller overtly requested that he be allowed to 
develop his  
ideas on the philosophy of the beautiful … in a series of individual 
letters addressed to you [Augustenburg], and which I could then lay 
before the public. This freer form would lend their presentation more 
individuality and life; and the idea that I addressed you, and was judged 
by you, would give me a greater interest in my material. (2016, 117) 
The epistolary form is thus an integral component of Schiller’s theory of the 
aesthetic. Like the aesthetic, the letter form mediates between life and form 
(the objects of the material and formal impulses respectively); it is receptive to 
the empirical vitality, variability and individuality of life, yet the (literal) nobility 
of judgement and reason provide it with an internal rational restraint.2 The 
letter form performs the aesthetic. 
 Equally significant is Schiller’s awareness of his two addressees: the 
individual letters to Prince von Augustenburg will be “[laid] before the public.” 
Just as the letter form mediates between life and form, so each line is written, 
at one and the same time, for the particular eyes of a Danish Prince and the 
abstract gaze of a universal mankind. In a formulation uncannily similar to 
Machiavelli’s dedicatory note to Lorenzo de’ Medici written three hundred 
years earlier,3 Schiller writes in a letter of 13th July, 1793:  
A conversation about such matters would have all the greater attraction 
for me the more that the position from which I, a private person [der 
                                                 
2 In the published version, Schiller refines this point: “What I had intended to ask of you as a 
favour you have generously made a duty, leaving me the appearance of merit when I am 
merely following my inclination” (2016, 3). The fusion of duty and inclination is integral to the 
aesthetic. 
3 “For those who draw maps place themselves on low ground, in order to understand the 
character of the mountains and other high points, and climb higher in order to understand the 
character of the plains. Likewise, one needs to be a ruler to understand properly the character 
of the people, and to be a man of the people to understand properly the character of rulers” 
(Machiavelli, 1988, 4). 
 Privatmann], regard the political world differs from that from which you, 
a prince and a ruling statesman, look down into the flow of events. 
What could be more delightful than to meet each other in the way of 
thinking just where external relationships bring about the greatest 
distance, converging on the same midpoint in the world of ideas from 
such an immeasurable distance in the actual world? (Schiller, 2016, 122; 
emphasis in original) 
Superficially, the sycophantic tone of address would support the now familiar 
argument that the aesthetic is precisely a substitute for radical social 
transformation – that is, one in which the social distinction of prince and 
private person is overcome in thought or beauty but not in practice. Yet this 
would be to underestimate the radical potential of Schiller’s theory, that which 
in Schiller goes beyond Schiller. Just as for Machiavelli there can be no 
knowledge of rulers except from the viewpoint of the people, so for Schiller 
there can be no theory or practice of the aesthetic that does not seek out the 
“midpoint” between ruler and ruled, state and private person.  
 The precise political configuration of this “midpoint” is, however, 
ambiguous. Schiller’s letters are philosophically and politically overdetermined, 
giving rise to a range of interpretations. Seen by Heidegger as “the first great 
retaliation against the French Revolution” (cited in Hartle 2009, 240) and more 
recently by Terry Eagleton (1990) as setting forth an ideological case for rule 
by consensus, one line of inheritance reads Schiller’s text as a proponent of 
reformist anti-Jacobinism. Alternatively, at the high-point of the German 
workers’ movement, Schiller was read by figures such as Franz Mehring as a 
thinker of the Left (Hartle 2009, 250, n. 35). More recently, Jacques Rancière 
has done much to make Schiller our renewed contemporary by locating in the 
paradoxes of the aesthetic a new artistic regime which initiates a democratic 
logic of the sensible (Rancière 2010, 115-133). Alongside Rancière’s theoretical 
intervention, Schiller has also been read as an inheritor and expander of the 
modern republican tradition of Machiavelli, Rousseau, Montesquieu and 
Ferguson (Beiser 2005; Moggach 2007). The sheer range of political 
interpretations to which Schiller’s letters seem to lend themselves would 
 suggest that the text is not only politically and historically overdetermined, but 
structurally ambiguous. 
This ambiguity consists of two principal moments. Firstly, 
philosophical concepts constantly function in Schiller’s letters as allegorical 
figurations of social classes, such that the opposition of form and matter is 
always implicitly mediated by the opposition between rulers and workers. The 
effect is to produce constant subtle but confusing shifts in scale between 
psychology and statecraft. Secondly, and more importantly, the letters seem to 
employ four closely related yet ultimately distinct and occasionally mutually 
contradictory understandings of beauty and the aesthetic:  
1. The “idea of beauty,” which entails the “completely pure union” of the 
two contrary (material and formal) impulses (Schiller 2016, 58), as set 
forth in Schiller’s overarching transcendental argument. 
2.  “Aesthetic culture,” which is a collective task empirically (and hence 
imperfectly) to apply the principles of the transcendental idea of beauty 
to the composition of artworks and critical judgement in the “arena of 
actuality” (61).  
3. ‘Spontaneous’ “beauty” or “aesthetic disposition of the soul” that 
arises from a chance combination of socio-ecological, proto-
evolutionary circumstances (99). 
4. The ‘aesthetic’ (comprising variations such as “aesthetic disposition” 
[ästhetische Stimmung], “aesthetic state” [ästhetischer Zustand] and “aesthetic 
state” [ästhetischer Staat]), which is a more diffuse and expanded set of 
arguments mediating between the first three strands, and informed by 
the republican ideals of equality, liberty and collective self-formation. 
Any reading of the letters is thus forced to plot a course through these 
ambiguities and destined to emphasise one line of argument over another. My 
own reading, while attempting to remain cognisant of the text’s ambiguities, is 
no different. 
 The aim of this chapter is to pursue the implications of the aesthetic, 
not only within Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, but also in the 
 writings of the ‘young’ Marx. I aim to read Marx’s earliest writings through the 
lens of Schiller’s letters and vice versa. In doing so, I hope to show that 
Schiller’s philosophy enables the recognition of a powerful strand of aesthetic 
logic within Marx’s developing theory of revolution and the state, whilst at the 
same time, seen retrospectively from the viewpoint of the early Marx, Schiller’s 
letters begin to reveal a hidden ‘red thread’. Unlike those ‘aesthetic’ readings of 
the young Marx that focus on the importance of the senses and alienation (e.g., 
Eagleton 1990), however, I ultimately understand the aesthetic in an expanded 
sense as an immanent modality of hegemony; art, beauty and “aesthetic 
culture” are thus conceived as moments within a more expansive aesthetic 
process.4 The point here is not to trace lines of direct ‘influence’ from Schiller 
to Marx, however valid such an approach might be, but rather to enable the 
writings of each to shed light on those of the other.  
 
Schiller’s Letters 
There exists within Schiller’s letters a radical line of argument which, if 
pursued to its conclusion, points beyond Schiller’s own inherent political 
limitations. I shall attempt to reconstruct this subversive logic in four stages: 
his historical criticism of modernity, the theory of the state, an implicit theory 
of hegemony, and – finally – Schiller’s ideal of the “aesthetic state.” It should 
be noted, however, that this operation entails a certain risk. As has been noted, 
Schiller was acutely aware of the importance of the letter form for his theory 
of the aesthetic, contrasting it explicitly to “the majority of our scholars [who] 
are so fearfully buckled into their systems that a somewhat unfamiliar form of 
                                                 
4 It is, of course, Rancière who has done most to unpick the various configurations of ‘art,’ 
‘life’ and ‘politics’ arising from what he takes to be the foundational conjunction of aesthetics: 
“Schiller says that aesthetic experience will bear the edifice of the art of the beautiful and of the 
art of living. The entire question of the ‘politics of aesthetics’ … turns on this short 
conjunction” (2010, 116; emphasis in original). It would take another article entirely to 
negotiate the strengths and shortcomings of Rancière’s approach, but suffice it to say that this 
is a quite severely selective reading of Schiller and that its principal category, “aesthetic 
experience,” is problematic given the precise philosophical status of the concept of 
“experience” within German idealism, not to mention the total absence of the phrase 
“aesthetic experience” from Schiller’s letters, which tend to speak instead of “aesthetic 
disposition” [ästhetische Stimmung] (often as “aesthetic disposition of the soul [Gemüth]”), 
“aesthetic state” [ästhetischer Zustand] or “aesthetic state” [ästhetischer Staat].  
 presentation cannot penetrate their triply armoured chests” (2016, 118). By 
abstracting theoretical propositions from the aesthetic form of the letter, I am 
consciously running the risk of “dissolving the necessary bond” between the 
“elements” of the “secret” of beauty, against which Schiller explicitly warns in 
his first letter (2016, 4). Nonetheless, the reconstruction of Schiller’s argument 
will ultimately arrive back at its point of departure – the “freer form” of the 
letter – at which point the theoretical will be ‘sublated’ within an expanded 
comprehension of the aesthetic.5 
In what would become a long line of intellectuals mobilising the image 
of the organic totality of ancient Greece against the fragmentation of 
modernity,6 Schiller bemoans several aspects of modern life. Firstly, “utility” 
[der Nutzen] has become the “great idol of the age, to which all powers are in 
thrall and all talent must pay homage” (5). Utility signals the predominance of 
the “material impulse” [sinnlichen Trieb] over the “formal impulse” [Formtrieb], 
the two contradictory drives that pull humanity between time, matter, 
contingency and sensation on the one hand, and eternity, ideas, necessity and 
freedom on the other.7 It will be the task of the aesthetic, through the “playful 
impulse” [Spieltrieb], to conjoin the two. The reign of utility is reinforced by 
egoism: “Egoism has established its system at the heart of the most elaborated 
sociability, and in the absence of its very own sociable heart we experience all 
the contagion and affliction of society” (15). Egoism is savagery to the second-
degree;8 having torn itself from the animalistic state of nature, humanity now 
freely submits to the tyranny of matter at the level of principle. Yet here one 
encounters a crucial and constitutive ambiguity in Schiller’s writing: the 
aesthetic education of “man” [Mensch] concerns at one and the same time 
individuals and social classes. As noted above, the material and formal 
                                                 
5 I write ‘sublated’ with caution since there is a sense in letter eighteen that Aufhebung for 
Schiller denotes a formal logical notion that remains too bound to the formal impulse. He 
seems to oppose to it the notion of a “completely pure union” (65). I am grateful to Hammam 
Aldouri for drawing my attention to this distinction. 
6 For a historical and philosophical reconstruction of this intellectual tradition, see Josef Chytry 
(1989). 
7 The Kantian architectonic is clearly visible here. 
8 Savagery for Schiller denotes a predominance of feelings or the “material impulse” over the 
“formal impulse”; barabarism denotes the inverse (cf. 2016, 12). 
 impulses are at once internal to individual “minds” or “souls” and allegorical 
of entire social classes: “We observe rough and licentious instincts among the 
lower and more numerous classes” (14) just as “the civilized classes represent 
the even more repugnant spectacle of lethargy and a depraved character which 
is all the more disgusting because culture itself [the form-giving force par 
excellence, DH] is its source” (15). Schiller is thus developing a theory of the 
politicised mutual determination of the senses and reason, which itself is an 
allegorical figuration of the division between ruler and ruled, intellectual and 
worker, yet a figuration which is active within the latter oppositions.9  
This lack of harmony between rulers and ruled is further aggravated by 
the processes of differentiation, fragmentation and specialisation that occur 
under the modern division of labour:  
The image of the human species in each of us has been enlarged, 
shattered and scattered as shards, not in proportioned admixtures; so 
that one has to go from one individual to another to reconstitute the 
totality of the species… [I]n practice our faculties express themselves 
as fragments corresponding to the analytical distinctions of the 
psychologist; not only individual subjects but entire classes of men 
realize only part of their endowments, while the remainder remain 
stunted, leaving hardly a dull trace of themselves. (Schiller, 2016, 18) 
Like Marx, Schiller understands the division of labour as historically necessary 
but profoundly mutilating. His impassioned critiques of utility, egoism and 
fragmentation converge in a passage that would not be out of place in Marx’s 
early writings: 
The more numerous part of mankind is too tired and exhausted from 
its struggle with need to gird itself up for a new and more intense 
struggle against error. Happy to avoid the troublesome effort of 
thinking, they gladly leave the control of their concepts to others; and 
                                                 
9 Terry Eagleton (1990, 113) makes a similar point: “Indeed the whole text is a kind of political 
allegory, in which the troubled relations between sense drive and formal drive, or Nature and 
reason, are never far from a reflection on the ideal relations between populace and ruling class, 
or civil society and absolutist state.” 
 if it so happens that they rouse themselves to higher needs, they seize 
with greedy credulity upon the formulations that state and priesthood 
have prepared for them in anticipation. If these unhappy souls deserve 
our sympathy, we are justified in despising those whom fortune has 
freed from the yoke of need, but who nonetheless choose to bend 
themselves to it. (27) 
The radical potential of this passage lies, as will become clear, in its 
interconnection of labour, philosophy, class and the state. Schiller’s aesthetic 
ideal, which “will combine the most abundant existence with the greatest 
autonomy and liberty” (47), would seem to presuppose an alleviation of 
economic exploitation combined with the development of – to risk an 
anachronism – organic intellectuals capable of leading the workers from error 
to truth, a task the state and priesthood are too corrupt to fulfil.  
Yet the true radicalism of Schiller’s position, glimpsed here in nuce, only 
fully emerges in his comments on the state. It is well known that Schiller’s 
letters condemn the authoritarian excesses of the state, whereby form is 
violently imposed upon a recalcitrant nature; he notes that “the constitution of 
a state will be very incomplete if it can bring about unity only by suppressing 
diversity” (11).10 It was this that led Terry Eagleton to argue that Schiller’s 
theory of the aesthetic is, effectively, a theory of Gramscian hegemony, 
whereby ‘hegemony’ is understood as rule by consensus rather than coercion. 
Yet a different reading is also possible, based on a closer engagement with the 
minutiae of Schiller’s argument and an alternative understanding of 
hegemony.11 Schiller writes that “every individual carries within himself … a 
purely ideal man” (10) and that this “pure man … is represented by [or 
through, durch –  DH] the state” (11). He continues: 
                                                 
10 In an article on aesthetics in German republicanism, Douglas Moggach has argued that 
“[t]he central political question for Schiller is the attainment of a unity that is compatible with 
difference, and that is brought about by spontaneous self-determination rather than by forcible 
imposition” (2016, 314). 
11 The latter is afforded by a major work of recent Gramsci scholarship: Peter D. Thomas’ The 
Gramscian Moment (2009). 
 But since the state should be an organization that creates [or forms/ 
educates – bildet] itself through itself for itself, it can only become 
actual to the extent that the parts have been attuned [or have attuned 
themselves] to the idea of the whole. Because the state represents the 
pure and objective humanity in the hearts of its citizens, it will have to 
observe with respect to its citizens the same relationship as each has to 
himself, and will be able to honour their subjective humanity only to 
the extent that it is refined into objective humanity.12 (13; translation 
modified) 
That the state should form and educate itself through itself for itself, immediately 
throws into doubt the traditional enlightenment hierarchy of (labouring) 
masses led to truth by (thinking) intellectuals. It is thus plausible to interpret 
the aesthetic as an immanent modality of ‘hegemony,’ but only if one 
understands the latter not as ‘class rule through consensus’ but as a process of 
mass self-education and collective intellectuality that Gramsci would come to 
identify with the figures of the organic intellectual and the “democratic 
philosopher” (Thomas, 2009, 429-436). This mass self-formation is not only 
intellectual but also pertains to aesthetic form, an insight whose political stakes 
become clear in Marx’s early writings on Prussian press censorship. Ultimately, 
the state for Schiller can only become actual to the extent that its citizens have 
formed and educated themselves in the Idea of the whole; to the extent that 
this is not so, the state will impose itself from above as a violent abstraction. 
 It is here that Schiller can be seen as an inheritor of Machiavelli’s 
modern republicanism and a forerunner of the young Marx’s critique of 
Hegel’s doctrine of the state. By reversing the classical priority of form over 
event, Machiavelli emphasised the active, formative role of subjectivity in 
                                                 
12 “Aber eben deswegen, weil der Staat eine Organisation seyn soll, die sich durch sich selbst 
und für sich selbst bildet, so kann er auch nur in so ferne wirklich werden, als sich die Theile 
zur Idee des Ganzen hinauf gestimmt haben. Weil der Staat der reinen und objektiven 
Menschheit in der Brust seiner Bürger zum Repräsentanten dient, so wird er gegen seine 
Bürger dasselbe Verhältniß zu beobachten haben, in welchem sie zu sich selber stehen, und 
ihre subjektive Menschheit auch nur in dem Grade ehren können, als sie zur objektiven veredelt 
ist” (Schiller, 2000, 17). 
 relation to the contingencies afforded by historical circumstance.13 In doing so, 
he transformed virtù into an impetuous, innovative, formative activity; it now 
named a self-organization of material and bodily expressions that became the 
ontological basis of his republicanism.14 Schiller, along with German 
republicanism in general, inherited this emphasis on collective self-
organisation, particularly as it relates to aesthetic form. The beautiful form, “a 
symbol of republican freedom,” is “flexible and spontaneous, describing the 
movements of the particulars who generate it … sustained by their own 
cooperation” (Moggach 2016, 315). It is precisely this line of aesthetic 
republicanism that Marx himself will employ to criticise Hegel’s doctrine of the 
state: 
In monarchy, the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its 
forms of existence, the political constitution; in democracy the 
constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of the 
people, and indeed as its self-determination … The constitution is in 
appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man. (Marx 1975 
[1843], 87; emphasis in original) 
This same logic of aesthetic self-organisation informs both Marx’s earlier 
writings on press censorship (as we shall see) and Schiller’s theory of the 
aesthetic state. As a process of intellectual and practical self-formation it is 
integral to the struggle for hegemony. 
To return now to Schiller, the second sentence in the previously 
quoted passage (Schiller 2016, 13) instigates a crucial and recurring line of 
thought throughout the letters. If the state is “to observe with respect to its 
citizens the same relationship as each has to himself” then the ideal state 
would be one in which representation has become so attenuated as to coincide 
with the minimal representational mediation necessary for one to relate to 
oneself. Indeed, representation in general gives rise to a constant risk of 
political abstraction: 
                                                 
13 See the introduction to the present volume and Vatter (2000). 
14 Again, see the introduction to the present volume. 
 Forced to deal with the diversity of its citizens through their 
classification, experiencing humanity only through representation, 
hence at second hand, the governor entirely loses contact with 
humanity [verliert der regierende Theil sie zuletzt ganz und gar aus den Augen], 
taking it for a mere construct of the intellect, while the governed are in 
turn indifferent [mit Kaltsinn] to laws that barely relate to them (Schiller, 
2016, 20). 
Yet if the state is to become coextensive with citizens’ self-relation, what form 
does this relation assume? Since for Schiller each citizen consists of both an 
absolute “I” or “person” and an empirical “I” or “individual” (a precursor of 
Marx’s “On the Jewish Question”), the (noumenal) person, to become actual, 
must determinately realise itself through time in a specific (phenomenal) 
situation:15 “It is only in the sequence of his ideas that the persisting I itself 
becomes manifested to itself [Nur durch die Folge seiner Vorstellungen wird das 
beharrliche Ich sich selbst zur Erscheinung]” (39). Consequently, either the state must 
relate to its citizens in analogy to the way in which citizens relate to themselves 
through the sequence of ideas or – pushing Schiller’s logic further – the state 
as ‘representative’ of the pure I in each citizen could be understood as 
providing the ideas through which each citizen mediates her relationship to 
herself – with Schiller becoming an incipient theorist of ideology. 
 The ideal state would be one in which the aesthetic process of mass 
self-education and self-formation renders unnecessary the abstraction of 
representation beyond what is necessary for citizens’ self-relation. Yet, as we 
have seen, because of utility, egoism, and the division of labour, “[t]he more 
numerous part of mankind is too tired and exhausted from its struggle with 
need to gird itself up for a new and more intense struggle against error” (27). 
Consequently, the “sequence of ideas” through which each citizen relates to 
herself is too erroneous to enable full self-manifestation; error arises from the 
lack of physical, moral, and theoretical vitality of the ruling class which exploits 
                                                 
15 As Beiser remarks, “[h]ere Schiller follows Fichte and breaks decisively (if silently) with 
Kant, he is virtually saying that the Kantian noumenal self exists only in and through its 
determinate phenomenal manifestations” (2005, 138). 
 workers’ exhaustion to maintain its hegemony (hegemony being always a 
relation of pedagogy). In a sentence reminiscent of E.IV.p1 of Spinoza’s Ethics 
(“Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it 
is true” (Spinoza, 1996, 117; emphasis in original)), Schiller bemoans the fact 
that the existence of Enlightenment reason has done nothing to dispel the 
deathly pall of error: “If truth is to prevail in battle it must itself first become a 
force, establishing an impelling force as its champion in the realm of appearances” 
(26). This “force” will combine elements of both drives: the material impulse 
and the formal impulse. “Graced” by form but in touch with life, such a 
persona “enlivens all acquaintances, in his worldly affairs steers all towards his 
own intentions” (34): the aesthetic can thus be read as an immanent modality 
of hegemony. 
If the driving force of the aesthetic is the “playful impulse,” its 
principal faculty is imagination. The imagination is the human equivalent of an 
energetic surplus in nature itself (cf. 106-107); its “whole charm” consists “in 
an unforced association of images [ungezwungene Folge von Bildern]” and the “play 
of freely associated ideas [Spiel der freyen Ideenfolge]” (107; emphasis in original). If it 
is “only in the sequence of his ideas that the persisting I itself becomes 
manifested to itself” (39), and if the ideal state is one which coincides with this 
self-relation, then human liberation is only possible when the state itself 
embodies free association. Given Schiller’s tendency to allegorical figuration, 
free association must be understood as at once the individual capacity for 
joyful, unrestrained concatenation of images and thoughts, as well as collective 
assemblies of bodies and minds freely exchanging ideas, forms and images 
with no censorious intervention from an abstract state. Yet “freely associated 
ideas” are still, within Schiller’s schema, residually connected to the material 
impulse; true aesthetic freedom must “[attempt] to find a free form” (107; 
emphasis in original). It is at this point that we return to the beginning: the 
epistolary form. 
Schiller sets out an array of sometimes puzzling preconditions for the 
advent of the aesthetic state. It requires: a socio-historical situation, arising out 
of contingency, which fuses sedentary, introspective individuality with 
 nomadic, centrifugal collectivity (99); an alleviation of immediate physical need 
(27, 100, 132–3); and the developed physiological receptivity of an aesthetically 
disposed eye and ear (101). These preconditions combine in the primal scene 
of the aesthetic: “[Man’s] tender beauty will bud only when he speaks silently 
to himself in his hut and, as soon as he comes out, speaks with all of his kind 
[da allein, wo er in eigener Hütte still mit sich selbst, und sobald er heraustritt, mit dem 
ganzen Geschlechte spricht, wird sich ihre liebliche Knospe entfalten]” (99; translation 
modified). A dialectic is thus produced between the “sequence of ideas” 
through which each person becomes individually manifested to herself, and 
the public and universal “free association” of ideas through collective debate 
and encounters (of which, from Marx’s perspective, a free press and the right 
to free assembly are historical pre-conditions).16 “[O]nly aesthetic 
communication unites society,” writes Schiller, “because it is based upon what 
is shared in common” (111). The letter form was the “freer form” (117) 
through which Schiller could speak to himself and to the public 
simultaneously. For the young Marx, the newspaper would assume a similar 
function; and by the time of “The Civil War in France” (1871) it would be the 
Paris commune that signalled “the political form at last discovered under 
which to work out the economical emancipation of labour” (Marx, 1974, 212). 
“It is only beauty,” writes Schiller, “that we enjoy as individual and genus, as 
representatives of the genus.” The aesthetic can thus be seen as a modality of 
hegemony, inscribed in a free, generic form in which individuals actualise 
themselves only through the full actualisation of the genus itself. 
 
                                                 
16 Cf. Gramsci on the historical preconditions of the “democratic philosopher”: “The 
environment reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of self-
criticism, functioning as ‘teacher’. This is why one of the most important demands that the 
modern intelligentsias have made in the political field has been that of the so-called ‘freedom 
of thought and of the expression of thought’ (‘freedom of the press’, ‘freedom of association’). 
For the relationship between master and disciple in the general sense referred to above is only 
realised where this political condition exists, and only then do we get the ‘historical’ realisation 
of a new type of philosopher, whom we could call a ‘democratic philosopher’ in the sense that 
he is a philosopher convinced that his personality is not limited to himself as a physical 
individual but is an active social relationship of modification of the cultural environment” 
(Gramsci, 1971, 350). 
 State Censorship, Style and Copyright in the Young Marx17 
Marx’s early writings share this concern with the actualisation of the genus.18 
What Marx seems to call for in these early texts is for human beings to become 
what they properly are. What we are in the young Marx’s eyes is productive, 
rational, social animals.19 These four attributes (‘animality’, taken from the 
subject ‘animal’, being the fourth) form the basis of human labour. This differs 
from mere animal activity in that it is universal (as opposed to unilateral), 
consciously undertaken (as opposed to instinctively performed), free (in that it 
can become an end-in-itself) and world-fashioning (in the sense that man’s 
natural history is a dialectical pole of human history as such).20 For Marx, 
labour is the constitutive life-activity of man, life-activity being what is 
determinate of a given genus.21 This means that man is a Gattungswesen, a 
species-being, not only in the sense that all humans belong naturalistically to 
the same genus,22 but also in the sense that what is universal to all human 
beings is precisely universality itself (Chitty, 2009, 128). Human labour is both 
internally and externally universal: it can be applied to any object at all (such 
                                                 
17 This section is a lightly adapted version of sub-chapters 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 of Hartley (2017), 
reproduced here with the kind permission of Brill. 
18 The best selection of these early writings in English remains Marx (1975c). 
19 Note the Aristotelian analogues of these terms: poiēsis (production), zōon logon echon (animal 
‘having’ language/ discourse) and zōon politikon (political animal). Nonetheless, it is also quite 
possible to see Marx’s conception of praxis and species-being as completely at odds with 
Aristotle’s understanding of a fixed human essence. See, for example, Margolis (1992). 
20 Adapted from Chitty (2009, 133). 
21 It goes without saying that Marx’s early, predominantly anthropological theory of human 
labour is a controversial one. It has given rise to two interconnected debates among its 
interpreters: the first concerns a so-called ‘break’ which occurs between the early and the 
mature Marx, from an initial anthropological focus on ‘human nature’ to a purely relational 
conception in which ‘human nature’ is rearticulated as the structural ensemble of social 
relations. The main progenitor of this line of thought was, of course, Louis Althusser (2005). 
The second issue concerns Marx’s theory of labour itself. Moishe Postone identifies two 
opposing interpretations which have produced ‘two fundamentally different modes of critical 
analysis: a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor, on the one hand, and a critique of 
labor, on the other’ (Postone, 1993, 5). The former assumes that labour is transhistorical 
whereas the latter identifies labour under capitalism as historically specific. In the first, labour 
is the subject of the critique of capitalist society, whilst in the latter it is the object. More recently, 
Jason Read has argued that both interpretations miss the point: ‘The opposition between these 
two critical strategies generally assumes that labor itself is one-sided, thus forgetting the duality 
of labor. An examination of the relationship between abstract and living labor makes possible 
a criticism in which labor is both the object, in the sense that it is a criticism of the apparatuses 
and structures that constitute abstract labor, and the subject, in the sense that it places the 
potentiality of labor at the center of this critique’ (Read, 2003, 77).  
22 This is one of the aspects of Feuerbach’s thought which Marx criticises in the sixth thesis on 
Feuerbach: “Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as ‘genus,’ as an internal, dumb 
generality which naturally unites the many individuals” (Marx, 1975c, 423). 
 that man “makes the whole of nature his inorganic body” (Marx, 1975c, 328)) 
and it is oriented to the human species as a whole, for it produces goods that 
in principle any human being could use (Chitty, 2011, 485).  
As it stands, however, man is currently unable to realise his own 
Gattungswesen: theoretically, he is a species-being, but is unable to activate this 
theory in practice. According to Marx, what prevents this realisation is 
alienation, a situation in which some (implicitly undesirable) third party 
intervenes between man and his essence as human. Joseph Margolis 
summarises this well: “man is alienated [for Marx] insofar as he fails to grasp 
that his own nature and the world’s (the world in which his labor – his praxis – 
is effective) are the products of his praxis, through history” (Margolis, 1992, 
337).23 The archetypal form of alienation is religion (since God is the ultimate 
mediator between man and his essence),24 but economic alienation is 
fundamental (especially in the form of the commodity, which masks the social 
relations of its production).25 For our purposes, however, the most significant 
form of alienation discussed in the early writings is political.26 The very 
existence of a political state, Marx claims, is already a sign of a cleavage 
between civil and political society: “the sphere in which man behaves as a 
communal being [Gemeinwesen] is degraded to a level below the sphere in which 
he behaves as a partial being … it is man as bourgeois, i.e. as a member of civil 
society, and not man as citizen who is taken as the real and authentic man” 
(1975c, 23). The consequence of this is a disjunction, as in Schiller, between 
sensuous content and abstract political form, between “man in his sensuous, 
individual and immediate existence” and “man as an allegorical, moral person” 
(ibid., 234). The form of the state hangs loosely on the body politic like a badly 
                                                 
23 There is, however, a problem with Margolis’ phrasing to the extent that it implies that man is 
alienated for primarily epistemological reasons; alienation is produced practically within the very 
process of production under the conditions of capitalistic private property: “grasping” this fact 
will not practically resolve it, since it is a “socially necessary illusion.” 
24 Cf. Feuerbach (1989, 153): “God is the concept of the species as an individual … he is the 
species-concept, the species-essence conceived immediately as an existence, a singular being 
[Einzelwesen].” 
25 Both religious and economic alienation are structured by the logic of the fetish. The 
commodity form – and capitalist private property more generally – conceals the four types of 
economic alienation Marx famously identified in the 1844 manuscripts: man’s alienation from 
the product of his labour, from his labour itself, from his species, and from his fellow men. 
26 This is obviously not to say that religious and economic alienation are not indirectly political.  
 fitting toga. True human emancipation, which Marx will come to know as 
“socialism,” would entail the return of man’s essence unto himself, the 
destruction of the mediator, and the reharmonising of form and content. In a 
passage reminiscent of Schiller’s aesthetic state, Marx writes: “Only when real, 
individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual 
man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his 
relationships … only then will human emancipation be completed” (ibid.). In 
this light, one might say that if Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach called for 
the realisation of philosophy in praxis, then “On the Jewish Question” offers a 
vision of Schillerian actualisation. 
Central to Marx’s analyses here – especially in his Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine 
of the State (1843), which prepared the theoretical ground for “On the Jewish 
Question” – is a theory of the modern state: “The abstraction of the state as 
such was not born until the modern world because the abstraction of private 
life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a 
modern product” (Marx, 1975c, 90). He contrasts the modern situation with 
that of the Middle Ages, in which “the life of the people was identical with the 
life of the state [i.e., political life]” (ibid.). As Lucio Colletti observes, “[p]olitics 
[in the Middle Ages] adhered so closely to the economic structure that socio-
economic distinctions (serf and lord) were also political distinctions (subject 
and sovereign)” (“Introduction” to Marx, 1975c, 34). Likewise, Marx also 
contrasts the modern state with the Greek polis in which “the political state as 
such was the only true content of their [the citizens’] lives and their 
aspirations” (1975c, 91). According to the young Marx, then, it is only in 
modernity that the political realm becomes abstracted from the life of the 
people as a particular reality over and above their daily existence. 
It is against this dual backdrop – that of Marx’s early writings on the state 
and Schiller’s theory of the aesthetic – that we should read the first newspaper 
article Marx ever wrote, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship 
Instruction” (1842). At the time, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had begun his reign by 
ostensibly relaxing censorship laws, only to find himself subsequently 
 incapable of controlling the liberal dissent he thereby unleashed.27 To 
counteract this wave of agitation, he promulgated new censorship instructions, 
effectively clamping down on his own liberalisations. One of the decrees of the 
new censorship instructions was that “censorship should not prevent serious 
and modest investigation of truth.”28 Marx responded to this restriction on the 
very style of journalistic writing with an argument which goes to the heart of 
his simultaneously aesthetic and political opposition to censorship: 
[T]ruth is general, it does not belong to me alone, it belongs to all, 
it owns me, I do not own it. My property is the form, which is my 
spiritual individuality. Le style c’est l’homme. Yes, indeed! The law 
permits me to write, only I must write in a style that is not mine! I 
may show my spiritual countenance, but I must first set it in the 
prescribed folds! What man of honour will not blush at this 
presumption and not prefer to hide his head under the toga? 
Under the toga at least one has an inkling of a Jupiter’s head. The 
prescribed folds mean nothing but bonne mine à mauvais jeu. (Marx, 
1975b, 112) 
[[D]ie Wahrheit ist allgemein, sie gehört nicht mir, sie gehört Allen, 
sie hat mich, ich habe sie nicht. Mein Eigenthum ist die Form, sie 
ist meine geistige Individualität. Le style c’est l’homme. Und wie! 
Das Gesetz gestattet, daß ich schreiben soll, nur soll ich einen 
anderen als meinen Styl schreiben! Ich darf das Gesicht meines 
Geistes zeigen, aber ich muß es vorher in vorgeschriebene Falten legen! 
Welcher Mann von Ehre wird nicht erröthen über diese 
Zumuthung und nicht lieber sein Haupt unter der Toga verbergen? 
Wenigstens läßt die Toga einen Jupiterkopf ahnen. Die 
vorgeschriebenen Falten heißen nichts als: bonne mine à mauvais 
jeu. (Marx, 1975a, 100)] 
At first glance, it would be easy to read this passage as indicative of Marx’s 
early Romanticism: the outrage of the poet-radical at an attempt to curb the 
individual creative genius, to set it in prescribed folds – the fury of a 
                                                 
27 I am basing this account on Rose (1978, 15–32). 
28 This is a quotation from the original censorship instruction, cited in Marx (1975b, 111). 
 Prometheus bound. There is certainly something in that reading, but a closer 
analysis reveals a coherent theory of style that links, not only to the central 
aspects of Marx’s early writings outlined above, but also to late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century theories of authorship and copyright. 
Firstly, he claims that truth is universal; it is only the form which is my 
individual property, my spiritual individuality. Next follows a series of 
conceptual and idiomatic puns on style as an individual’s spiritual face, 
countenance or visage – in other words, style as the physiognomy of an 
individual writer, indicative of his inner being (Schiller’s “person”). What the 
state is trying to do, Marx suggests, is to force the writer to screw his face into 
an alien pose. The German here is vorgeschriebene Falten, which literally means 
“prescribed folds,” but which, in the idiomatic phrase mein Gesicht in Falten legen, 
has another primary sense of “frowning pensively,” drawing as it does on the 
meaning of Falte as “wrinkle.”29 At this point, Marx claims that it would be 
better to hide one’s head beneath a toga than contort one’s spiritual 
countenance into a state-decreed rictus. The issue of style and censorship 
reproduces on a smaller scale the larger problem of the political state as such: 
the state enforces the merely abstract universality of the legal person onto the 
authentic, sensuous individual. A “freer form” of association (to quote 
Schiller) – one in keeping with the inherent sociality of man’s species-being – 
would enable a type of individual stylistic expression whose limits were self-
willed rather than externally imposed. That is to say, Marx does not seem to be 
calling for some spontaneous Romantic formlessness, but rather for a form of 
collective aesthetic self-regulation: a stylistic concrete universal in which the 
styles through which humans articulate what Schiller called the “sequence of 
ideas” through which they manifest themselves arise organically through 
common and free association. 
                                                 
29 It is no coincidence that Schiller’s artistic ideal is the Juno Ludovisi: “[the Greeks] banished 
from the brow of the blessed gods all the gravity and labour that furrow the cheeks of mortals, 
together with all those frivolous pleasures that smooth empty faces, freed those who were 
eternally content from the fetters of any purpose, any obligation, any cares, making idleness and 
indifference the envied lot of the gods: simply a more humane name for the freest, most sublime 
being” (Schiller 2016, 57). 
 This argument takes on new light in the context of nascent eighteenth-
century theories of copyright law. In the passage cited above, Marx 
(mis)quotes Buffon’s well-known phrase, Le style est l’homme même [(the) style is 
(the) man himself]. This dictum is usually taken to mean that style reflects 
personality, but in fact its meaning is somewhat different.30 It occurred in the 
context of Buffon’s inaugural 1753 address to the French Academy. Buffon 
informed his fellow immortels that facts, knowledge and discoveries were 
external to man, the common property of all. They were, he said, appropriable, 
liable to transportation and alteration: 
Only those works which are well written will pass into posterity 
… if they are written without taste, without nobility and without 
genius, they will perish, because knowledge, facts and discoveries 
are easily appropriable; they travel and even gain from being put 
to work by more skilful hands. These things are outside of man; 
style is man himself. Thus, style cannot be appropriated, nor 
transported, nor altered: if it is elevated, noble, sublime, the 
author will be equally admired in all ages; because truth alone is 
durable, even eternal.31 
[Les ouvrages bien écrits seront les seuls qui passeront à la 
postérité … s’ils sont écrits sans goût, sans noblesse et sans génie, 
ils périront, parce que les connaissances, les faits et les 
découvertes s’enlèvent aisément, se transportent et gagnent même 
à être mises en oeuvre par des mains plus habiles. Ces choses sont 
hors de l’homme, le style est l’homme même: le style ne peut 
donc ni s’enlever, ni se transporter, ni s’altérer: s’il est élevé, 
noble, sublime, l’auteur sera également admiré dans tous les 
temps; car il n’y a que la vérité qui soit durable et même éternelle. 
(Buffon, 1853, 330)] 
Style, then, as opposed to knowledge, facts and discoveries, is immutable, 
immovable and immortal. Style is the man himself; it is, one might say, his 
                                                 
30 M. H. Abrams (1953, 373, n. 13) has noted this misunderstanding. 
31 My own translation of the French passage cited directly below. 
 property, the proper of man: like Schiller’s notion of the “person,” it cannot be 
expropriated, it never changes and it never differs. 
In 1753, however, these philosophical pronouncements on style had not yet 
been codified into law. It was only Fichte’s intervention into late eighteenth-
century German copyright disputes that enabled this to happen. At the time, 
piracy was rife, and there was still no unified pan-Germanic legal system or 
rationale to deal with it.32 The very notion of the author as legal proprietor was 
still in the process of being born. It was in the context of these simultaneously 
economic and aesthetic debates that in 1793 Fichte wrote his essay, “Proof of 
the Illegality of Reprinting.” He begins by distinguishing between the physical 
[körperlich] and intellectual [geistig] aspects of a book (Fichte in Mayeda, 2008, 
173–4).33 The physical refers to the printed paper. The intellectual can be 
further subdivided into its material [materielle] aspect – the ideas communicated, 
or the ideational content – and its formal aspect – the style in which these ideas 
are presented. By defining rightful ownership as when the expropriation of a 
thing by others is physically impossible, Fichte declares that when a book is 
sold ownership of the physical object and its ideal content passes to the 
buyer.34 The form of this ideational content, however, remains eternally the 
author’s own:  
[T]hat which can simply never be appropriated by anyone, since it 
is physically impossible, is the form of the thoughts, the 
connections between ideas, and the signs by means of which ideas 
are presented. Each person has his own manner of thinking, and 
his own unique way of forming concepts and connecting them. 
(Fichte in Mayeda, 2008, 176)  
Whilst Fichte does briefly attempt to distinguish form from “manner” [Manier] 
(2008, 177), it is quite clear that his own understanding of ‘form’ is very similar 
                                                 
32 For the historical background I rely heavily on Woodmansee (1984). 
33 Mayeda’s commentary includes a full translation of Fichte’s article, with the German and 
English in parallel columns: cf. Fichte in Mayeda (2008, 171–98). This is the source of my 
quotations from Fichte. 
34 Whereas in terms of the physical object, the author cedes all proprietary rights to the buyer 
on purchase, in terms of ideas the author remains a co-proprietor (Fichte in Mayeda, 2008, 
175–6). 
 to Buffon’s notion of ‘style’: that which is proper to each individual. Fichte 
thus provided the rational grounds for literary ownership and authorship and, 
at the same time, for the illegality of piracy; he did so by privatising that which 
in Schiller remains the very point of intersection between the person and the 
commons: “the sequence of ideas” or “freely associated ideas.” In doing so, he 
helped fundamentally to alter the understanding of what a writer was: no 
longer the patronised, neo-classical imitator of nature, but an Urheber, an 
originator and creator.35 
If we now return to Marx’s article on censorship, we see it in a whole new 
light. This is not – or not only – Marx the Romantic, chafing at the bit of 
mundane restrictions on individual creation. On the contrary, when Marx 
states that a man’s style is his property he means it quite literally. State 
censorship is a form of expropriation: the expropriation of form, of individual 
property. As Margaret Rose has observed (Rose, 1978, 29), in attempting to 
confer its identity upon its citizens, the state has succeeded only in 
expropriating them of their own identity – of that which is proper to them. So 
we are left in somewhat of a quandary: the very Romantic theory of the author 
as unique, individual originator developed partly because of the very system of 
private property that Marx used it to criticise. Just as Marx attacked Proudhon 
for declaring that “Property is theft!”, since the concept of theft presupposes 
private property (Marx and Engels, 1956, 128), so Marx’s attack on the censors 
for forcibly expropriating the formal property of man presupposes an 
individual with property rights. In attempting to stress the inner contradictions 
of the bourgeois state, Marx in a sense falls short of the implicit radicalism of 
Schiller’s aesthetic commons, since the latter would entail the rejection, not 
only of the state’s violent abstractions, but also of the privatisation of the 
stylistic commons effected by copyright law. 
 
Wood-Theft and the Commons 
                                                 
35 Woodmansee (1984) deals with this aspect in great detail. 
 In his article on “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood” (1842), however, 
Marx was very much aware of the privatisation of the commons, and 
developed a profoundly Schillerian critique of the criminalisation of wood-
gathering. Once a customary right of peasants, the gathering of dead wood on 
residual common land was increasingly being penalised as theft. Traditionally, 
such gathering had been unrestricted but the scarcities caused by the agrarian 
crises of the 1820s and the increase in industrialisation, beginning in earnest in 
the following decade, led to severe legal controls: during this period five-sixths 
of all prosecutions in Prussia dealt with wood (McLellan 1976, 56). The 
gathering of dead wood was now treated as harshly as the cutting down and 
theft of living timber. In some cases, ‘thieves’ were compelled to carry out 
forced labour for forest owners. 
 What is significant about Marx’s biting articles on this topic is that his 
disgust at the profound injustice of these laws is inextricable from a critique of 
private interest and the state that is articulated in surprisingly Schillerian terms. 
Broadly speaking, Marx attacks private interest on three levels: ontology, 
character and logic. When subordinated to private interest the state becomes 
incapable of subtle differentiations of being:  
The gathering of fallen wood and the theft of wood are therefore 
essentially different things. The objects concerned are different, the 
actions in regard to them are no less different; hence the frame of 
mind must also be different, for what objective standard can be applied 
to the frame of mind other than the content of the action and its form? 
But, in spite of this essential difference, you call both of them theft and 
punish both of them as theft. (Marx, 1975d, 227) 
Just as Schiller had warned that “the constitution of a state will be very 
incomplete if it can bring about unity only by suppressing diversity” (2016, 11), 
so the power of private interest has led the Prussian state intentionally to 
suppress ontological distinctions. Private interest has the capacity violently to 
simplify the world:  
 [interest] makes the one point where the passer-by comes into contact 
with him into the only point where the very nature of this man comes 
into contact with the world. But a man may very well happen to tread 
on my corns without on that account ceasing to be an honest, indeed 
an excellent, man. Just as you must not judge people by your corns, 
you must not see them through the eyes of your private interest. (235-
6) 
Existential variety and multiplicity of being is violently suppressed. 
Consequently, in subordinating itself to interest, the state becomes incapable 
of “observ[ing] with respect to its citizens the same relationship as each has to 
himself” (Schiller, 2016, 13); on the contrary, Marx explicitly notes that interest 
“do[es] not look at a thing in relation to itself” (1975d, 248). In Schillerian 
terms, interest thus prevents the true actualisation of the state. 
 Marx’s second line of attack concerns character, a recurring theme 
throughout Schiller’s letters.36 Private interest, writes Marx, has a “petty, 
wooden, mean and selfish soul” (235). If the state subordinates itself to private 
interest, it limits its own moral, practical and affective scope: 
This claim on the part of private interest, the paltry soul of which was 
never illuminated and thrilled by thought of the state, is a serious and 
sound lesson for the latter. If the state, even in a single respect, stoops 
so low as to act in the manner of private property instead of in its own 
way, the immediate consequence is that it has to adapt itself in the 
form of its means to the narrow limits of private property. (241) 
This concern with character and soul is integral to the young Marx’s 
developing theory of revolution.37 Just as Schiller had claimed that he who 
successfully combines matter and form “enlivens all acquaintances, in his 
worldly affairs steers all towards his own intentions” (2016, 34), so Marx 
suggests that magnanimity is a precondition of hegemony. Likewise, just as 
Schiller had bemoaned the paltry soul of the “civilized classes,” those who 
                                                 
36 See especially letters three and four. 
37 The best account of this theory is Löwy (2005). 
 failed to follow Kant and Horace’s dictum (sapere aude!) and dare to use their 
understanding, so the young Marx gradually came to understand that no 
“particular class” in Germany – especially the bourgeoisie – was capable of 
becoming a revolutionary force by uniting the whole of society behind it 
through “a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses”: 
in Germany every particular class lacks not only the consistency, 
acuteness, courage and ruthlessness which would stamp it as the 
negative representative of society; equally, all classes lack that breadth 
of spirit which identifies itself, if only for a moment, with the spirit of 
the people, that genius which can raise material force to the level of 
political power, that revolutionary boldness which flings into the face 
of its adversary the defiant words: I am nothing and should be everything. 
The main feature of German morality and honour, not only in 
individuals but in classes, is that modest egoism which asserts its 
narrowness and allows that narrowness to be used against it. (Marx, 
1975, 254-5) 
Thus, for both Schiller and Marx, magnanimity and an expansive vitality are 
integral to winning hegemony. If for Schiller it was only the aesthetic that was 
capable of combining philosophical rigour, moral audacity, and affective 
vivacity, for the young Marx it became the proletariat: “Philosophy cannot 
realise itself without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and the 
proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [Verwirklichung] of 
philosophy” (1975, 257). 
 Marx’s final line of attack on private interest was its total disregard for 
logic: “it is not concerned about contradictions, for it never comes into 
contradiction with itself. It is a constant improviser, for it has no system, only 
expedients” (1975d, 247). Expediency is what happens to logic under the 
gravitational pull of money. Where a philosophical system presupposes internal 
logical coherence, according to laws of non-contradiction, interest is a bricoleur 
of reason, cobbling together ad hoc positions on the basis of whatever happens 
to be necessary to make a profit. Seen in light of the previous criticisms, it can 
 be concluded that Marx’s contempt for private interest is total: interest 
subordinates the universal state, the supposed embodiment of man’s species-
being, to petty materialist egoism; it violently suppresses ontological 
multiplicity; it prevents the magnanimity of character necessary for 
revolutionary hegemony; and it negates conceptual rigour. It does all of this to 
the end of dispossessing German peasants of one of their sole means of 
survival. 
 
Conclusion: For an Aesthetic Commons 
What emerges from this reading of Schiller’s letters in light of Marx’s early 
writings (and vice versa) is a radical Schiller and a young Schillerian radical. 
Their respective, often vituperative, critiques of the abstract, authoritarian state 
and the petty egoism of private interest are remarkably similar in certain key 
respects. Likewise, their visions of collective self-realisation have much in 
common. Schiller’s aesthetic ideal combines “the most abundant existence 
with the greatest autonomy and liberty” in a state which is nothing other than 
the everyday practice of free association inscribed in “free forms” whose law is 
“to give freedom by means of freedom” (2016, 110; emphasis in original). Marx 
envisaged an association of free and equal producers in a society that 
“produces man in all the richness of his being” (1975c, 354) who “has become 
a species-being in his empirical life” (ibid., 234).38 Both Schiller and Marx saw 
aesthetic forms as integral to the realisation of these visions. Schiller’s claim 
that it is “only in the sequence of his ideas that the persisting I itself becomes 
manifested to itself,” seen in light of Marx’s writings on censorship, as well as 
eighteenth-century copyright law, points to the political necessity of defending 
or constructing an aesthetic commons: a press free from state censorship and 
subordination to capital, the freedom of association to enable joyful bodily and 
intellectual encounters (a precondition of hegemony), and a commonwealth of 
forms that are the collective product of writers and artists speaking to 
themselves in the language of the whole.  
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